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Resumen 
El concepto de corrupción varía ampliamente dependiendo no solo de cada sociedad sino también de 
cada individuo. Es esperable que el contexto incida en la percepción del individuo. Algunos trabajos 
previos demuestran la incidencia de las características individuales juegan un rol relevante al igual que 
los efectos fijos por país. Por lo tanto, extendiendo la literatura sobre el tema, el objetivo de este trabajo 
es analizar la incidencia de estos efectos por país, es decir, analizar como el contexto, la cultura y/o la 
historia influyen en la percepción de corrupción, considerando características específicas de los países 
incluidos en la muestra. Para ello a partir del módulo de Identidad Nacional de la encuesta del 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) realizada en 2004, se estiman modelos probit ordenados 
considerando sub-muestras de países con características en común. Se encuentra que aún entre países 
que tienen alguna característica en común (por ejemplo, el tamaño, el pertenecer a la Unión Europea 
etc.) se mantiene la incidencia del efecto país. Se encuentra evidencia sobre la relevancia de la cultura y 
el contexto y ciertos patrones de comportamiento al considerar características a nivel de país.  
 
Palabras claves: corrupción, comportamiento microeconómico, análisis comparativo, opinión pública, 
ISSP 




The concept of corruption varies widely depending on societies and people. We expect that context 
influences on corruption perception. Previous studies shed light on the incidence of individual 
characteristics on the perceived level of corruption and show the effect of country of residence. In order 
to extend this previous research, the aim of this paper is to analyze how context, culture and/ or history 
shape corruption perception considering specific country characteristics. The data source is the module 
on Citizenship of the 2004 International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Taking into account some sub-
samples (considering country characteristics such us: size, European Union membership, etc.), we 
estimate ordered probit models. We find that the incidence of country of residence remains even when 
we consider countries with some characteristic in common. 
 
Key words: corruption, microeconomic behavior, comparative research, public opinion, ISSP 
JEL Classification: D73, K42, O57 Introduction 
 
As previous studies emphasize corruption is a cultural phenomenon and consequently, its 
connotations vary widely depending not only on societies but also on people. Consequently, we 
expect that background influence on corruption perception. For example, we except that economic 
performance, inequality, political conditions etc. play a relevant role in determining individual’s 
perceptions and decisions.  
 
The data source is the module on Citizenship of the 2004 International Social Survey Program 
(ISSP). The survey asks respondents (approximately 1.000 per country) their opinions on a great 
variety of issues, including international trade, migration, corruption, politics or religion. In addition, it 
includes demographic and socio-economic data, such as: age, gender, education and others. 
 
Taking into account country characteristics, we estimate ordered probit models in order to study 
whether country effects remain even when we consider countries with some characteristic in 
common. We conclude that there are socio-demographic variables which are significant at 
determining corruption perception (such us: religion, education, sector of employment, etc.). 
Additionally, in almost all cases the country of residence remains significant.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The first section is theoretical in nature, and draws on the 
definition of corruption and the existing and well-developed theory on the subject. The second 
section sketches the main features of the econometric methods applied in this analysis, the data 
source and the description of variables. Section three deals with our results. Finally, the conclusions 
are presented in section four. 
 
I. Corruption perception: background 
 
The first problem of any comparative research on corruption is arriving at a definition which lends 
itself to cross-cultural and cross-national research. In economic terms, there are several ways to 
define corruption. This paper focuses on a wide concept of corruption: the misuse of public office 
with the purpose of making private gains; this definition incorporates the notions of wrongly getting 
an advantage, pecuniary or otherwise, in violation of official duty and the rights of others.  
 
We expect that background plays a relevant role in shaping people’s perception of corruption and 
differences in context may explain variations across nations. For example, the incident of past 
experiences of corruption (history), the effects of institutional conditions (political context, law 
enforcement and the judiciary), economic performance (poverty or inequality), etc.   4
 
As Cábelková (2001) argues the actual level of corruption and the authority’s level of tolerance 
influences the incentives to take corrupt actions. This perception may affect both the demand and 
supply of corrupt actions. On the other hand, rules modify the decision-making process. The 
fulfillment of rules implies costs that could be seen as the time and information needed. Therefore, if 
individuals need a lot of time or information to fulfill a rule, the probability of behaving in accordance 
with the law decreases (Svetozar, 1985).  
 
Moreover, You and Khagram (2005) show that income inequality is a significant determinant of 
corruption. With increased inequality, the rich, as a class or as an interest group, can use lobbying 
to influence law-implementing processes and to buy favorable interpretations of the law. According 
to Ghersi (2006), the most relevant conclusion is that the cost of legality is inversely proportional to 
an individual’s income. 
 
Finally, given an identical background, people’s perceptions will vary depending on individual 
characteristics such as values and moral views, which modify the perception of the expected costs 
and expected benefits. Moreover, the formation of individual perceptions about the level of 
corruption is affected by the access to information and the capability to analyze it. Personal 
experience has a significant role; it depends on the interaction among the citizen and corrupt civil 
servants.  
 
II. Data source and methodology 
 
As mentioned, the data source is the module on Citizenship of the 2004 International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP).
1 The survey asks respondents their opinions on a great variety of issues, including 
international trade, migration, politics, taxes and corruption, as well as demographic and socio-
economic information, such as age, gender, education, religiosity and others. The question used in 
the survey to identify respondent’s perception of corruption is: 
 
Taking into account your experience, 
how widespread do you think corruption is in the public service in your country? 
 
This question seeks to grasp citizen’s perception of corruption and answers take values between 0 
and 4 which correspond to the following categories: 0 if respondent answers “hardly anyone”, 1 if 
respondent indicates “a small number”, 2 if respondent says “a moderate number”, 3 if respondent 
indicates “a lot of people” and 4 if respondent answers “almost everyone”. 
                                                 
1 More information is available on ISSP website: www.issp.org.    5
 
Table 1 shows the weighted frequency distribution of the answers to this question in the whole 
sample (more than 45,000 respondents). 
 
Insert Table 1: Answers 
 
Our ordered probit models aim at determining how different individual characteristics and country of 
residence shape the formation of opinions towards corruption among government employees.  
 
The estimated parameters in ordered probit models do not provide direct information on the 
relationship between the independents and our dependent variables. Substantive interpretations 
are usually based on the prediction of probabilities and on the marginal effects of the independent 
variables.  
 
Insert Table 2: Country abbreviations 




The model includes dummy variables representing individual characteristics and in order to capture 
fixed effects per country we include dummy variables reflecting country of residence.  
 
We estimated six different sub-samples taking into account the following criteria: 1) big and small 
countries (we classified all countries taking into account the population, a country is big if the 
number of inhabitants is higher than the sample mean), 2) European Union (EU) countries and non 
European Union countries (NOEU)
2 and 3) income level: middle income (MI) countries and high 
income (HI) countries (World Bank classification, Atlas Method). Table 4 lists all sub-samples and 
shows that the groups are not nested, for example, United States is a big country that not belong to 
the European Union and a high income country.  
 
Insert Table 4: Description of sub-samples 
 
Table 5 shows all estimated models, the general model (ALL) is our reference point and it was 
taken from Melgar, Rossi and Smith (2008). 
 
Insert Table 5: The models 
                                                 
2 As the survey was carried out during 2004, we considered the group of countries that were members in 2003.   6
 
Three models (small countries, EU countries and HI countries) show that gender is significant and 
as in the case of the general model, the results show that women are more likely than men to 
perceive a higher level of corruption. 
 
Secondly, in all cases, we also find that the variables reflecting individual’s age are not significant. 
Once again, there are no significant differences among age groups.  
 
Thirdly, while the general model shows that those people who are married tend to perceive a lower 
level of corruption and that the opposite is true for those who are divorced; our sub-sample models 
show some specificities: five sub-models show that while those people who are married or (live as 
married) tend to perceive a lower level of corruption than other people. The exemption is MI 
countries model: divorced people are more likely to perceive a higher level of corruption in small 
countries, EU countries and HI countries. In the case of big countries and non-EU countries only 
being married is significant and none of those variables are significant in the case of MI countries. 
 
Moreover, as the general model shows the level of education has a relevant role in determining 
corruption perception. In all cases, it was found that people who have a university degree are more 
likely to perceive a lower level of corruption. Moreover, with the exemption of MI countries, people 
who have completed at least secondary education also tend to perceive a lower level of corruption. 
It is known that the perceived level of corruption could be very different from the actual level; 
therefore, this result could imply that access to information and the capability to process this 
information matter: more educated people have more information about the actual level of 
corruption and better capabilities to process the information and this fact influences on the 
formation of the perception of corruption. 
 
Regarding religion and religiosity this sub-models also confirm our hypothesis. Firstly, once again 
there are no significant differences among religious groups (Roman Catholic, Protestant and 
others). On the other hand, in the following cases: small countries, EU countries and HI countries; 
the degree of religiosity (measured as attendance to religious services), does influence the 
perception of corruption; it decreases the probability of perceiving the higher level of corruption. 
 
In contrast with the general model, taking into account the place of residence, we found that only in 
one case, MI countries, there is a significant difference among people living in urban areas and 
others. In this case, people who live in urban areas are less likely to perceive a higher level of 
corruption than people living in rural areas. 
   7
Concerning the labor market, we found again a significant difference among people who are self-
employed and other people. In all cases, self-employed people tend to perceive a higher level of 
corruption. It might be possible that those people are exposed to more incidents of corruption.  
 
Additionally, in all cases the sector of employment is a determinant of corruption perception. Those 
who are working in a private enterprise are more likely to perceive a higher level of corruption than 
those who are employed in the public sector. 
 
On the other hand, it is worth noting that only in HI countries model, there is a significant difference 
among people who are unemployed and those who are employed. Moreover, only in the case of EU 
countries, those people who belong to a union are more likely to perceive a lower level of 
corruption. On the other hand, being retired has no significant effect. 
 
Connected with democracy, in all cases, we found that those who have a favorable opinion on 
democracy are more likely to perceive a lower level of corruption.  
 
Taking into account country dummies, almost all variables are significant. This result might mean 
that significant cultural and political differences that influence the perception of corruption remain. 
 
Although the sub-models take into account countries with some characteristic in common, it is worth 
noting that in general, country dummies are significant. This result might mean that there are 
significant cultural and political differences that influence the perception of corruption.  
 
We calculate the marginal effects and their standard errors after estimation. Rather than reporting 
coefficients, tables 6.1 and 6.2 report the discrete change in the probability for each model and 
significant variable. The marginal effects are nonlinear functions of the estimated parameters, so 
they cannot generally be inferred directly from the parameter estimates. 
 
Insert Table 6.1: Marginal effects (individual characteristics). 
 
As could be seen in table 6.1, the probability of perceiving the highest level of corruption, for the 
whole sample, is 5.6% (the general model). The highest probability is found in the case of MI 
countries (20%) and the EU registers the lowest probability (1.9%). This table also reports the 
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III.1 Individual characteristics 
 
Firstly, taking into account respondent’s gender and in the case of EU countries, we found that the 
probability of perceiving the highest level of corruption raises 0.5 percent points (pp) when we 
consider a woman instead of a man which is the same increase registered in the general model. In 
other cases, this change is smaller (0.3 pp in the case of small countries and HI countries). 
 
Regarding marital status, if we take into account married people we found an important variability in 
the probability change. This probability decreases between 0.2 pp (EU countries and HI countries) 
and 0.7 pp (big countries). On the other hand, if divorced, this probability increases between 0.3 pp 
(EU countries) and 0.6 pp (small countries) when we change to divorced people. 
 
The same happens when we consider the third and fourth levels of education. The general model 
shows that the probability reduces 1 pp and 2.8 pp respectively. However, in the first case, it 
reduces between 0.7 pp (small countries and HI countries) and twice more, 1.4 pp (big countries). 
In the second case the impact and the variability are bigger, the lowest reduction is 1.4 pp (EU 
countries) and the biggest reduction is 3.8 pp (big countries).  
 
If the person attends religious services once a week or more frequently, the decrease in the 
mentioned probability is between 0.3 pp (HI countries) and 0.7 pp (small countries). Once again we 
find that the heterogeneity among countries is relevant. 
 
Additionally, the general model shows that the probability of perceiving the highest level of 
corruption increases 1.1 pp. However, the sub-samples show that the increase ranges from 0.3 pp 
(EU countries) and 1.8 pp (MI countries). If the person is self-employed also increases the 
probability and in this case the change ranges from 0.5 pp (EU countries) and 3.4 pp (MI countries). 
Moreover, in the case of HI countries, this probability also increases if the person is unemployed 
(0.6 pp). Belonging to a union is also significant in the case of EU countries and in this case, the 
probability reduces 0.1 pp. In the case of MI countries, the probability increases 2.1 pp if the person 
lives in an urban area. 
 
Finally, we also find that the performance of democratic institutions have the most significant impact 
on corruption perception that also show a relevant change when we compare among the sub-
models. The probability reduces between 4 pp (EU countries) and 11.8 pp (MI countries) when we 
change from someone who believes that the state of democracy in his/her country is not 
satisfactory to someone who has a favorable opinion.  
 
   9
III.2 Country effects 
 
Table 6.2 summarizes the information about the change in the probability of perceiving the highest 
level of corruption for each model and country variable. 
 
Insert Table 6.2: Marginal effects (fixed effects per country). 
 
Comparing the general model with our sub-sample models, we find that: 1) the ranking of countries 
remains and 2) in almost all cases we find a great variability in the change in the probability so 
country specificities matters. The impact changes because they were computed taking into account 
a different sample and with respect to a different country. 
 
    1. Big countries 
 
In this model, the changes were computed with respect to Brazil; given that this country ranks first 
in our previous model all values are negative. The lowest reduction in the probability or the highest 
level of corruption perception was found, once again, in Latin American: Venezuela (-8.6 pp) and 
Mexico (-11.5 pp).  
 
Asian countries also show a clear pattern of behavior. All countries are found in the first half of the 
table: Russia registers the smallest change with respect to Brazil (-17.2 pp) followed by Philippines 
(-21.1 pp), South Korea (-28.8 pp), Japan (-30.5 pp) and Taiwan (-34.6). In this sub-sample, all EU 
countries show a significant difference with Brazil and are found in the second half of the table. The 
smallest impact is found in the case of Germany (Germany East -36.5 pp and Germany West: -36.6 
pp) and Great Britain shows the highest impact (-39.6 pp). On the contrary, among Anglo-
settlement colonies we found a heterogonous pattern of behavior, while United States is found in 
the first half of the table (-33.4 pp); Canada and Australia registered higher changes (-37.1 pp and -
38.9 pp, respectively). Once again, analyzing political characteristics, we found that the former 
Socialist states of Eastern Europe included in this sub-sample are located in the first half of the 
table: Poland (-15.5 pp) and Russia (17.2 pp). 
 
    2. Small countries 
 
Small countries show lower heterogeneity than big countries. In this case, the changes in the 
probability are computed with respect to Israel and the biggest negative impact was found in 
European countries: Denmark and Finland (-18.3 pp). Once against those countries register the 
lowest levels of corruption perception. Latin American countries (Chile and Uruguay) are found in 
the first half of the table showing the same value (-9.6 pp). In the case of the EU (and considering   10
the group of countries which belongs to it before 2004), two countries (Portugal and Ireland) and 
Flanders are founded in the first half of the table and four countries (Sweden, Austria, Finland and 
Denmark) in the second half. Others European countries could be found in the first half of the table, 
it is worth noting that those countries belong to Europe but are poorer than the others and belong to 
the former Socialist states of Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, the sole country that registers a positive 
change with respect to Israel, (3.6 pp), Slovenia (-8.2 pp), Czech Republic (-8.6 pp), Latvia (-9.7 pp) 
and Hungary (-12.1 pp). 
 
    3. EU countries 
 
In this model the omitted variable is Ireland and as the table 6.2 shows, in almost all cases country 
variables register a negative sign; this results indicates that inhabitants of those countries tend to 
perceive a lower level of corruption than Ireland has. Portugal is the only exemption to this group of 
countries; this variable shows a positive sign. Among EU citizens, people from Portugal are likely to 
perceive the highest level of corruption than people from others EU countries, the probability 
increases 6.3 pp. Regarding the others countries, the probability reduces from 0.2 pp (Spain) to 3 
pp (Denmark and Finland).  
 
    4. Non-EU countries 
 
Taking into account non-EU countries model, once again the omitted variable is Brazil and all 
values are negative. As in the first model, Venezuela and Mexico are found at the top of the table, 
indicating the smallest impacts in the probability that reduces 9.5 pp and 12.3 pp, respectively with 
respect to Brazilians. Regarding others Latin American countries, Uruguay and Chile are situated in 
the second half of the table (-30.5 pp and -30.6 pp, respectively). Something similar happens in the 
case of Asia. Only, Japan and Taiwan are found in the second half of the table. The reductions in 
the probability of perceiving the highest level of corruption are 31.9 pp and 35.6 pp, respectively. On 
the contrary, Anglo-settlement colonies (United States, Canada and New Zealand) fall in the bottom 
half as do the majority of rich countries, the probability reduces: -34.6 pp, -37.8 pp and -40.1 pp, 
respectively. Others European rich countries also show significant reductions in the probability; for 
example: Switzerland (-39.7 pp) and Norway (-39.8 pp). 
 
Taking into account political characteristics, we found once again, that the former Socialist states of 
Eastern Europe are located in the first half of the table in the following order: Bulgaria (-15.5 pp), 
Poland (-17 pp), Russia (-19.1 pp), Slovakia (-20.7 pp), Czech Republic (-28.9 pp), Slovenia (-28.9 
pp), Latvia (-30.2 pp) and Hungary (-32.8 pp). As the results shows, those countries registered a 
lower change in the probability than others European countries that did not belong to the EU in   11
2003. As mentioned, this result could be related to the past experiences of corruption at the 
governmental level than to present events. 
 
    5. High income countries 
 
In this model, with the exemption of Israel (9 pp), all countries registered a negative value. Finland 
and Denmark show the biggest negative change: -9.5 pp. It is important to notice that: firstly, Czech 
Republic and Slovenia (both of them are ex- Socialist states of Eastern Europe) are not significant 
and secondly, there is no Latin American country in this sub-sample. Something similar happens in 
the case of Asia, all countries are found in the first half of the table: Israel and Japan (9 pp and -2.3 
pp, respectively). In the case of the EU, Portugal shows the smaller negative impact, -1.5 pp and in 
the other cases the impact in the probability is -7.3 or bigger (in absolute value). Canada and United 
States are found in the first half of the table: -7.4 pp and -4.3 pp, respectively. However, New 
Zealand (the other Anglo-settlement colony) is situated in the second half: -9.3 pp. 
 
    6. Middle income counties 
 
In this model all country variables are significant and show a negative impact in the probability 
(once again the omitted variable is Brazil). The biggest negative impacts were found in the cases of 
Taiwan, Hungary and Uruguay: -36.6 pp, -33 pp and -30.9 pp, respectively. Regarding Latin 
American countries, Venezuela and Mexico are found at the top of the table, in those cases the 
probability reduces 7.7 pp and 11.8 pp, respectively. On the contrary, Chile and Uruguay are 
founded in the second half of the table: -29.7 pp and -30.9 pp. In this model, Brazil is the omitted 
variable. Only the former Socialist states of Eastern Europe are the European countries in this sub-
sample. While Bulgaria (-16.2 pp), Poland (-16.4 pp), Slovakia (-19.6 pp) and Russia (-19.8 pp) are 
situated in the first half of the table; Latvia and Hungary are founded in the second half of the table 




All estimated models show that some individual characteristics have a significant effect on the 
probability of perceiving the highest level of corruption. Moreover, taking into account country 
characteristics we find several specificities. For example: 1) while small countries, EU countries and 
HI countries register a gender bias the opposite is true in the case of big countries, non EU 
countries and middle income countries, 2) only in one case, being unemployed is significant (HI 
countries), 3) living in a city plays a relevant role only among MI and 3) belonging to a union is 
significant only among EU countries.    12
 
On the other hand, we found that some results remains: in all sub-models working in a private 
enterprise, being self-employed and having a university degree are significant. The relevance of 
those results is twofold. Firstly, they strengthen the role of education (that reduces the probability of 
perceiving the highest level of corruption). Secondly, among those who work at the private sector or 
who are self-employed are the people who bribe (the other part of the transaction). 
 
Taking into account fixed effects, as expected; in most cases country dummies were significant. 
Regarding countries ranking, in general, we found that all Latin American countries showed 
changes which are higher than the average and the same is true for ex-Socialist states and the 
majority of East Asian countries. Moreover, almost all East Asian countries are found in the first half 
of the table with the exception of Taiwan falling just bellow the top half. On the contrary, the majority 
of European countries showed lower changes than the average, only Portugal is found in the top 
half of the table. We also found that all Anglo-settlement colonies fall in the bottom half as do the 
majority of rich countries.  
 
When we consider the sub-samples models, we find, in general, that the ranking of countries 
remains. However, the models show that there are no significant differences among some countries 
that were included in the same sub-model. Therefore, taking into account background effects 
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Annex - Tables 
 
Table 1 - Distribution of answers 
Taking into account your experience, how widespread do 
you think corruption is in the public service in your country? 
Categories Frequency 
Hardly anyone  4,28% 
A small number  26,86% 
A moderate number  30,55% 
A lot of people  26,60% 
Almost everyone  11,71% 
Total  100% 
 
 
Table 2 - Country abbreviations 
Abbreviations   Country     Abbreviations Country   
AT Austria    IL Israel 
AU Australia    JP Japan 
BG Bulgaria    KR South  Korea 
BR Brazil    LV Latvia 
CA Canada    MX Mexico 
CH Switzerland    NL Netherlands 
CL Chile    NO Norway 
CY Cyprus    NZ New  Zealand 
CZ Czech  Republic    PH Philippines 
DEE East  Germany    PL Poland 
DEW West  Germany    PT Portugal 
DK Denmark    RU Russia 
ES Spain    SE Sweden 
FI Finland    SI Slovenia 
FLA Flanders    SK Slovakia 
FR France    TW Taiwan 
GB Great  Britain    US United  States 
HU Hungary    UY Uruguay 
IE Ireland    VE Venezuela 
 
   14
Table 3 - Description of independent variables 
Area Variable  Values  Mean 
ATHEIST  1 if respondent does not identify with a religious group  0.195 
ATTENDANCE  1 if respondent attends religious services once a week or more  0.189 




PROTESTANT  1 if respondents religion is Protestant  0.220 
UNEMPLOYED  1 if unemployed   0.075 
RETIRED   1 if retired   0.191 
EMP_FT   1 if employed full time  0.438 
PRIVATE_S  1 if working for a private enterprise   0.399 




UNION  1 if belonging to an union   2.330 
EDU_LEVEL2  1 if respondent is above lowest qualification  0.203 
EDU_LEVEL3  1 if respondent has completed higher secondary or above higher 
secondary level  0.379 
Human 
Capital 
EDU_LEVEL4  1 if respondent has a university degree  0.146 
Place of 
residence  URBAN  1 if respondent lives in a big city, suburb or outskirt of a big city  0.444 
GENDER  1 being a woman   0.533 
AGE1  1 if respondent’s age is between 18 and 39 years old  0.395 
AGE2  1 if respondent’s age is between 40 and 60 years old  0.379 





DIVORCED  1 if divorced   0.083 
Others 
variables  DEM_TODAY  1 if respondent places the state of democracy in his country among 
5 to 10  0.723 
   15
Table 4 – Description of sub-samples 
Country BIG  SMALL  EU  NON_EU  HI MI 
Austria    ●  ●  ●  
Australia  ●    ●  ●  
Brazil  ●    ●  ● 
Bulgaria    ●  ●  ● 
Canada  ●    ●  ●  
Chile    ●  ●  ● 
Cyprus    ●  ●  ●  
Czech Republic    ●  ●  ●  
Denmark    ●  ●  ●  
Finland    ●  ●  ●  
Flanders    ●  ●  ●  
France  ●  ●  ●  
Germany (E)  ●  ●  ●  
Germany (W)  ●  ●  ●  
Great Britain  ●  ●  ●  
Hungary    ●  ●  ● 
Ireland    ●  ●  ●  
Israel    ●  ●  ●  
Japan  ●    ●  ●  
Latvia    ●  ●  ● 
Mexico  ●    ●  ● 
Netherlands  ●  ●  ●  
New Zealand    ●  ●  ●  
Norway    ●  ●  ●  
Philippines  ●    ●  ● 
Poland  ●    ●  ● 
Portugal    ●  ●  ●  
Russia  ●    ●  ● 
Slovenia    ●  ●  ●  
Slovakia    ●  ●  ● 
South Korea  ●    ●  ●  
Spain  ●  ●  ●  
Sweden    ●  ●  ●  
Switzerland    ●  ●  ●  
Taiwan  ●    ●  ● 
United States  ●    ●  ●  
Uruguay    ●  ●  ● 
Venezuela  ●    ●  ●   16
Table 5 - The models 
   ALL  BIG SMALL  EU NON_EU HI  MI 
WOMAN 0.042**  0.039  0.043*  0.099***  0.012  0.067***  0.000 
   (0.017)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) 
AGE1  -0.004 0.017 -0.015 -0.039 0.014 -0.020 0.040 
   (0.031)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.058) (0.036) (0.038) (0.051) 
AGE2  -0.015  -0.022  -0.002 -0.067 0.014 -0.040 0.030 
   (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.037)  (0.049) (0.021) (0.029) (0.037) 
MARRIED -0.039***  -0.046***  -0.032*  -0.051**  -0.036**  -0.050***  -0.030 
   (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.022) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) 
DIVORCED 0.057**  0.033  0.076**  0.067* 0.045  0.090***  -0.02 
   (0.029)  (0.051)  (0.032)  (0.040) (0.039) (0.029) (0.054) 
EDU_LEVEL2  -0.001  -0.038 0.026 -0.049 0.033 -0.020 0.020 
   (0.025)  (0.038)  (0.032)  (0.040) (0.032) (0.035) (0.026) 
EDU_LEVEL3 -0.092*** -0.092** -0.094***  -0.174*** -0.046* -0.140*** -0.030 
   (0.024)  (0.037)  (0.031)  (0.035) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) 
EDU_LEVEL4 -0.287*** -0.278*** -0.303*** -0.416*** -0.219*** -0.390***  -0.104* 
   (0.044)  (0.076)  (0.045)  (0.060) (0.054) (0.047) (0.058) 
EMP_FT  -0.031*  -0.023 -0.04  -0.032 -0.031 -0.020 -0.050 
   (0.019)  (0.026)  (0.028)  (0.032) (0.024) (0.021) (0.037) 
UNEMPLOYED  0.065 0.082 0.047 0.033 0.077  0.106**  0.040 
   (0.043)  (0.076)  (0.042)  (0.059) (0.055) (0.045) (0.066) 
RETIRED  -0.022 -0.048 -0.002 -0.014 -0.024 -0.020 -0.010 
   (0.030)  (0.047)  (0.034)  (0.056) (0.030) (0.042) (0.031) 
PRIVATE_S  0.100*** 0.108*** 0.093***  0.074** 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.064** 
   (0.016)  (0.026)  (0.021)  (0.030) (0.019) (0.021) (0.026) 
SELF_EMP  0.131*** 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.100*** 0.143*** 0.140*** 0.116*** 
   (0.019)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.035) (0.023) (0.027) (0.028) 
UNION -0.010  -0.011  -0.01  -0.027**  0.000  -0.010  -0.020 
   (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.023) 
ATHEIST  0.052 0.053 0.046 0.004 0.065 0.040 0.090 
   (0.039)  (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.042) (0.050) (0.047) (0.061) 
R_CATHOLIC  -0.001 0.029 -0.036 -0.047 0.010 0.000 -0.020 
   (0.036)  (0.055)  (0.043)  (0.050) (0.042) (0.045) (0.058) 
PROTESTANT  -0.006  -0.012  -0.011 -0.061 0.005 -0.010 -0.040 
   (0.039)  (0.051)  (0.055)  (0.056) (0.046) (0.043) (0.078) 
ATTENDANCE  -0.043** 0.000 -0.093***  -0.134*** -0.009 -0.074*** -0.010 
   (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.030) 
DEM_TODAY -0.509*** -0.469*** -0.549*** -0.581*** -0.478*** -0.597*** -0.407*** 
   (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.046)  (0.049) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) 
URBAN  0.019 0.037 0.005 0.017 0.019 -0.010 0.074* 
   (0.021)  (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.036) (0.026) (0.023) (0.041) 
AT 0.110***   -1.265***  -0.281***  -0.914***  
   (0.019)   (0.064)  (0.027)  (0.040)  
AU   -1.845***    -1.909***  -1.000***  
    (0.073)    (0.056)  (0.020)    17
BG 1.486***   0.126***  -0.432***  -0.441*** 
   (0.054)   (0.027)  (0.043)  (0.050) 
BR 1.936***             
   (0.045)             
CA 0.300***  -1.557***     -1.630***  -0.682***  
   (0.012)  (0.063)     (0.048)  (0.030)  
CH -0.085***   -1.472***  -1.994***  -1.115***  
   (0.016)   (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.040)  
CL 0.897***   -0.445***  -1.031***  -0.931*** 
   (0.027)   (0.052)  (0.039)  (0.050) 
CY -0.190***   -1.572***  -2.092***  -1.203***  
   (0.034)   (0.042)  (0.063)  (0.050)  
CZ 0.978***   -0.387***  -0.943***  0.000   
   (0.026)   (0.047)  (0.041)  (0.030)  
DEE 0.317***  -1.493***   -0.083  -0.709***  
   (0.023)  (0.073)   (0.059)  (0.040)  
DEW 0.333***  -1.497***   -0.057  -0.690***  
   (0.013)  (0.069)   (0.039)  (0.030)  
DK -0.464***   -1.846***  -0.860***  -1.481***  
   (0.019)   (0.071)  (0.054)  (0.040)  
ES 0.337***  -1.523***   -0.028***  -0.671***  
   (0.017)  (0.057)   (0.011)  (0.040)  
FI -0.421***   -1.811***  -0.824***  -1.447***  
   (0.017)   (0.072)  (0.053)  (0.040)  
FLA 0.296***   -1.081***  -0.106***  -0.722***  
   (0.016)   (0.048)  (0.029)  (0.030)  
FR 0.347***  -1.498***   -0.022  -0.659***  
   (0.015)  (0.056)   (0.024)  (0.030)  
GB -0.216***  -2.037***   -0.622***  -1.251***  
   (0.011)  (0.077)   (0.041)  (0.030)  
HU 0.746***   -0.620***  -1.164***  -1.096*** 
   (0.021)   (0.049)  (0.039)  (0.050) 
IE 0.331***   -0.999***    -0.660***  
   (0.023)   (0.059)    (0.040)  
IL 1.343***       -0.595***  0.406***  
   (0.044)       (0.039)  (0.040)  
JP 0.820***  -1.033***     -1.110***  -0.144***  
   (0.026)  (0.061)     (0.045)  (0.020)  
KR 0.935***  -0.944***     -1.014***    
   (0.027)  (0.055)     (0.038)    
LV 0.908***   -0.456***  -1.010***  -0.975*** 
   (0.025)   (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.040) 
MX 1.605***  -0.311***     -0.336***  -0.312*** 
   (0.042)  (0.019)     (0.018)  (0.030) 
NL -0.161***  -2.001***   -0.568***  -1.185***  
   (0.010)  (0.072)   (0.027)  (0.030)  
NO -0.132***   -1.515***  -2.041***  -1.138***    18
   (0.014)   (0.066)  (0.064)  (0.030)  
NZ -0.245***   -1.625***  -2.147***  -1.263***  
   (0.008)   (0.057)  (0.060)  (0.030)  
PH 1.287***  -0.620***     -0.657***  -0.596*** 
   (0.040)  (0.030)     (0.026)  (0.040) 
PL 1.459***  -0.434***     -0.480***  -0.448*** 
   (0.044)  (0.028)     (0.024)  (0.030) 
PT 0.893***   -0.437***  0.530***   -0.095**  
   (0.026)   (0.045)  (0.027)  (0.040)  
RU 1.362***  -0.486***     -0.547***  -0.553*** 
   (0.048)  (0.060)     (0.043)  (0.050) 
SE 0.145***   -1.244***  -0.248***  -0.856***  
   (0.016)   (0.066)  (0.058)  (0.030)  
SI 0.980***   -0.367***  -0.944***  0.01   
   (0.025)   (0.040)  (0.032)  (0.030)  
SK 1.324***   -0.009  -0.603***  -0.546*** 
   (0.037)   (0.047)  (0.027)  (0.030) 
TW 0.533***  -1.313***     -1.385***  -1.329*** 
   (0.027)  (0.059)     (0.043)  (0.050) 
US 0.646***  -1.220***     -1.297***  -0.309***  
   (0.019)  (0.057)     (0.040)  (0.020)  
UY 0.894***   -0.449***  -1.029***  -0.986*** 
   (0.023)   (0.043)  (0.032)  (0.040) 
VE 1.672***  -0.231***     -0.253***  -0.200*** 
   (0.047)  (0.030)     (0.027)  (0.040) 
Observations 37681 17673 20008 13211 24470 24333 13348 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   It indicates that the variable is not included 
   It indicates that the variable was omitted due to collinearity 
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Table 6.1 - Marginal effects 
   ALL BIG  SMALL  EU  NON_EU  HI  MI 
PROBABILITY  0.056 0.099 0.041 0.019 0.092 0.020 0.200 
GENDER  0.005    0.003  0.005    0.003    
MARRIED  -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002     
DIVORCED  0.007    0.006  0.003    0.005    
EDU_LEVEL3  -0.010 -0.014 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007     
EDU_LEVEL4  -0.028 -0.038 -0.020 -0.014 -0.033 -0.015 -0.028 
EMP_FT  -0.004                   
UNEMPLOYED                 0.006    
PRIVATE_S  0.011 0.017 0.007 0.003 0.017 0.005 0.018 
SELF_EMPLOYED  0.016 0.023 0.011 0.005 0.025 0.008 0.034 
UNION           -0.001          
ATTENDANCE  -0.005    -0.007  -0.006    -0.003    
DEM_TODAY  -0.070 -0.084 -0.056 -0.040 -0.090 -0.043 -0.118 
URBAN                    0.021 
   An empty cell indicates that the variable is not significant 
 
 Table 6.2 - Marginal effects – ranking of countries. 
ALL     BIG     SMALL     EU     NON_EU     HI     MI 
BR 0.392     VE -0.086     BG 0.036     PT 0.063     VE -0.095     IL 0.090     VE -0.077 
VE 0.294     MX -0.115     SI -0.082     ES -0.002     MX -0.123     PT -0.015     MX -0.118 
MX 0.271     PL -0.155     CZ -0.086     FLA -0.007     BG -0.155     JP -0.023     BG -0.162 
BG 0.232     RU -0.172     PT -0.094     SE -0.015     PL -0.170     US -0.043     PL -0.164 
PL 0.223     PH -0.211     CL -0.096     AT -0.016     RU -0.191     FR -0.073     SK -0.196 
RU 0.194     KR -0.288     UY -0.096     NL -0.025     IL -0.204     IE -0.073     RU -0.198 
IL 0.189     JP -0.305     LV -0.097     GB -0.027     SK -0.207     ES -0.073     PH -0.211 
SK 0.184     US -0.334     HU -0.121     FI -0.030     PH -0.222     CA -0.074     CL -0.297 
PH 0.174     TW -0.346     IE -0.157     DK -0.030     CZ -0.289     DEW -0.074    LV -0.307 
SI 0.102     DEE -0.365    FLA -0.162     IE        SI -0.289     DEE -0.075    UY -0.309 
CZ 0.102     DEW -0.366    SE -0.170     DEE       LV -0.302     FLA -0.076     HU -0.330 
KR 0.093     FR -0.366     AT -0.171     DEW       KR -0.303     SE -0.082     TW -0.366 
LV 0.089     ES -0.368     CH -0.178     FR        UY -0.305     AT -0.084     BR    
CL 0.086     CA -0.371     NO -0.179     AU        CL -0.306     AU -0.087     AT    
UY 0.086     AU -0.389     CY -0.180     BG        JP -0.319     CH -0.090     AU    
PT 0.086     NL -0.395     NZ -0.181     BR        HU -0.328     NO -0.090     CA    
JP 0.073     GB -0.396     FI -0.183     CA        US -0.346     NL -0.091     CH    
HU 0.062     BR        DK -0.183     CH        TW -0.356     CY -0.092     CY    
US 0.049     AT        IL        CL        CA -0.378     GB -0.093     CZ    
TW 0.036     BG        SK        CY        AU -0.394     NZ -0.093     DEE    
FR 0.019     CH        AU        CZ        CH -0.397     FI -0.095     DEW    
ES 0.018     CL        BR        HU        NO -0.398     DK -0.095     DK    
DEW 0.018    CY        CA        IL        CY -0.400     KR        ES    
IE 0.018     CZ        DEE        JP        NZ -0.401     CZ        FI    
DEE 0.017    DK        DEW        KR        BR        SI        FLA    
CA 0.016     FI        ES        LV        AT        BG        FR    
FLA 0.015     FLA        FR        MX        DEE        BR        GB    
SE 0.006     HU        GB        NO        DEW        CL        IE    
AT 0.005     IE        JP        NZ        DK        HU        IL    
CH -0.003     IL        KR        PH        ES        LV        JP    
NO -0.004     LV        MX        PL        FI        MX        KR    
NL -0.005     NO        NL        RU        FLA        PH        NL    
CY -0.006     NZ        PH        SI        FR        PL        NO    
GB -0.006     PT        PL        SK        GB        RU        NZ    
NZ -0.007     SE        RU        TW        IE        SK        PT    
FI -0.010     SI        TW        US        NL        TW        SE    
DK -0.011     SK        US        UY        PT        UY        SI    
AU        UY        VE        VE        SE        VE        US    
   It indicates that the variable is not significant                                     
   It indicates that the variable is not included                                     
   It indicates that the variable was omitted due to collinearity                            
 
 